This is part of the book I am working on, on creatio ex nihilo.

 

            This is a selection from my current book project, A Brief Process Reappraisal of Creatio Ex Nihilo.  I am citing and responding to my friend Tom Oord.  My respect for Tom is profound.  We agree on a lot!  This is about the only substantive disagreement I have with him. I thought this blog was a good place to share this.

My friend and colleague Thomas Jay Oord mentions on his website, Nine Problems with Creatio Ex Nihilo. (Tom's essay can be found here.) I honestly don’t see any of these as problems myself, but some of them are better ideas than others.  Overall, though, I do not find these objections very convincing.  I will list the nine points, and respond to each in italicized type.

1. Theoretical problem: absolute nothingness cannot be conceived. I do not see this as a problem.  Just because someone cannot conceive of something does not mean that no one could ever conceive of it.  At best that seems to me to be an unknown.
2. Historical problem: Creatio ex nihilo was first proposed by Gnostics – Basilides and Valentinus – who assumed that creation was inherently evil and that God does not act in history.  It was adopted by early Christian theologians to affirm the kind of absolute divine power that many Christians – especially Wesleyans – now reject.  Two things here.  I believe we need to be open to truth no matter what the source, so who proposed creatio ex nihilo has no bearing on whether it is true.  I also think that just because an idea was conceived to support another idea does not mean the idea is false.  Elton Trueblood used to say if Y is a consequent of X, and X is proven false, Y is also false.  But that is not what this is.  This is saying an idea was formed to support an idea, and that is not the same as being a consequent.  I believe again that has no bearing on the truth of a concept.

3. Empirical problem: We have no evidence that our universe originally came into being from absolutely nothing.  We also have no evidence that it did not.  And even if we have evidence that our current universe came from some precedent material, we have no conclusive evidence that matter has always existed.  At best, this seems to me to push the argument back a step, but does not settle the ultimate issue of creatio ex nihilo.
4. Creation at an instant problem:  We have no evidence in the history of the universe after the big bang that entities can emerge instantaneously from absolute nothingness.  Out of nothing comes nothing (ex nihil, nihil fit).  I have the same problem here as I did on point 3.  Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.   This goes to the heart of my earlier statement that physical science cannot verify metaphysical realities.  Assuming there are no metaphysical realities does nothing to address that deficiency.
5. Solitary power problem: Creatio ex nihilo assumes that a powerful God once acted alone.  But power is a social concept only meaningful in relation to others. The assumption here is one which could point either way.  If absolute nothingness cannot be conceived, then a single power acting alone cannot be conceived, perhaps.  But then again, neither of those assumptions clarifies or proves anything.  This is speculative, on Tom’s part and on my part also.  But I do not think this assumption is necessary          .
6. Errant revelation problem: The God with the capacity to create something from absolutely nothing would apparently have the power to guarantee an unambiguous and inerrant message of salvation (e.g, inerrant Bible).  An unambiguously clear and inerrant divine revelation does not exist.  I find this interesting but unpersuasive.  Keep in mind that the Bible was written by humans, who gave witness to their encounter with God.  There were no humans at creation, regardless of what creation model we operate from.  This is like saying that because I need help to build a house, I need help to make an omelet.  I don’t think that is necessarily the case.
7. Evil problem: If God once had the power to create from absolutely nothing, God essentially retains that power.  But a God of love with this capacity is culpable for failing to use it periodically to prevent genuine evil. This is more challenging.  I will address it in a later chapter, but I will say here I do not think this assumption is necessarily true.  It is entirely plausible that the power to create a universe from nothing has nothing to do with the power to prevent evil.  It is possible that God is not omnipotent, because omnipotence is simply impossible, whether or not God created from nothing.
8. Empire Problem: The kind of divine power implied in creatio ex nihilo supports a theology of empire, which is based upon unilateral force and control of others. I do not find this convincing. Tom and I share a concern and an opposition to unilateral force, although I do believe some things should be mandated for people to do for the common good.  I do not think vaccines should be voluntary, for example.  But I do still think it is possible for God to create from nothing without being coercive. It does not seem to me that creating from nothing is any more coercive than creating from something.  In fact, I think I could argue it is actually less coercive because creating from nothing does not force anything to become something other than what it is.  If creating from nothing is coercive, then any time a painter paints or a sculptor sculpts, that is also coercive because it is forcing something to become something other than what it is.
9. Biblical problem: Scripture – in Genesis, 2 Peter, and elsewhere – suggests creation from something (water, deep, chaos, invisible things, etc.), not creation from absolutely nothing. Tom is correct here.  But because we do not believe in biblical inerrancy, I do not think this point is conclusive.  This is where philosophical thinking also has to weigh in.

Again, I want to reiterate that my respect for Dr. Oord is profound.  His books have helped me make sense out of some of the most difficult issues in my own life—which range from being a man with a disability to being the victim of religious and spiritual abuse.  So none of these critiques are personal.   I know him well enough to know his disagreement with my critique will not be personal either.

      It is also necessary to reiterate here that by no means am I certain that I am correct.  I do think, however, in the best of the philosophical spirit, these challenges will help people on both sides clarify, sharpen, and refine their own positions, which is the ultimate goal of exchanges like this one.